We address whether mutual funds act as effective corporate monitors through the proxy voting process. We examine 212,620 voting decisions made by 1,794 mutual funds from 
Introduction
The role of the mutual fund as monitor is unclear. Their large ownership stake and investment sophistication suggest that mutual funds should be effective monitors (Pound, 1988) . However, due to free-rider problems and liquidity concerns, mutual funds (as well as other institutions) have been accused of taking the easy way out by selling their shares instead of undertaking costly monitoring (Bhide, 1993) . Given their growing ownership of U.S. stocks, mutual funds could have a major impact on their portfolio firms if they choose to be effective monitors; as of 2006, mutual funds owned more than 25% of all U.S. stocks (Investment Company Institute 2006 Fact Book) . In this paper, we provide new evidence on the role of mutual funds as corporate monitors by studying an observable action of mutual funds -their proxy voting decisions. Besides private negotiations (which are largely unobservable) and unloading shares, proxy voting is the most direct action that mutual funds can take to influence management's actions and/or the firm's corporate governance. Therefore, examining mutual fund voting decisions provides direct evidence on the funds' role as corporate monitors.
Using recently available data, we examine fund voting decisions on 1,047 shareholder-sponsored proposals for meetings taking place between July 2003 and June 2005. We compile 212,620 voting decisions made by 1,794 mutual funds from 94 fund families. We provide new evidence on four important questions. First, do mutual funds exercise their voting power as effective monitors? Second, do funds' characteristics influence their effectiveness as monitors? Third, are mutual funds more likely to support proposals targeting firms with weak governance? Last, do mutual funds' voting decisions significantly impact voting outcomes?
We find that while funds, on average, are likely to vote against shareholder proposals, they do appear to support those proposals that may increase shareholder wealth. Specifically, mutual funds tend to vote more in favor of board, governance, and compensation proposals than environmental and social proposals. They also vote more affirmatively for ISS recommended proposals and proposals that the prior literature has identified as having a significant valuation impact on a firm such as declassifying the board or repealing a poison pill. These trends are even more noticeable when we compare the approval rates of mutual funds to those of the other shareholders. Mutual funds have lower overall approval rates; however, if the proposal concerns important aspects of corporate governance or targets a potential agency conflict such as golden parachutes or poison pills, then mutual funds vote more affirmatively than other voters. In other words, mutual funds act more like monitors than do other shareholders.
We also find that funds do not always vote consistently within fund families and that the characteristics of the fund affect its effectiveness as a monitor. Although there is some evidence that fund families coordinate voting decisions at the family level, we find that funds within the same fund family do vote differently from each other and that the divergence is more apparent for complex issues or issues that could potentially have a large impact on firm value. Additionally, social funds, funds with lower turnover and expense ratios, and funds with larger percentage holdings in the targeted firm are more likely to vote for shareholder proposals. Mutual funds are also more likely to vote affirmatively for proposals when targeted firms have weaker corporate governance (firms with higher Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick G-index, larger boards, fewer independent directors on the board, and lower levels of institutional holdings). Last, we find that mutual fund voting has a significant impact on the success of shareholder proposalshigher support by funds leads to a greater likelihood of passage of the proposal.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. While the prior literature has examined the relation between voting outcomes and institutional ownership, these papers provide only indirect evidence since they are constrained by using aggregate institutional ownership holdings as a proxy for institutional monitoring. We are able to provide direct evidence on mutual fund voting by using the actual mutual fund voting decisions. Further, by directly studying the observable action of proxy voting by mutual funds, our results contribute to the debate of whether mutual funds serve as effective monitors and how their voting decisions impact the growing movement of increased shareholder activism. Several working papers have focused on the increased levels of submissions of shareholder resolutions and the subsequent success of some proposals on issues such as majority voting, declassifying the board, and expensing stock option (Cai, Garner, and Walking, 2006; Guo, Kruse, and Nohel, 2006; Ferri, Markarian, and Sandino, 2006) . Our results suggest that mutual fund voting decisions may play an important role in the passage of these items.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines the role of mutual funds in the proxy voting process and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and our data. Section 4 examines the mutual fund voting decisions and Section 5 concludes.
Monitoring, shareholder proposals, and voting

Related literature
Separation of ownership and control in large corporations gives rise to agency conflicts (Berle and Means, 1932) . Monitoring of managers by various stakeholders of the firm is one of the major mechanisms used to control agency conflicts between managers and investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Gillan, 2006) . Monitoring can take several forms including monitoring by outside auditors, the board of directors, and shareholders themselves. A large body of the research on shareholder monitoring has focused on monitoring by institutions. Given their size, institutions are likely to hold larger share amounts than other investor types and are considered by many to be more sophisticated than other investors (Pound, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . Previous research has used aggregate institutional holdings levels to proxy for the strength of monitoring by institutional investors and the results on the role of institutional investors as monitors are not clear (see, for example, Bushee, 1998; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2006; Gasper, Massa, and Matos, 2005; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003) .
The role of institutional investors as monitors in the proxy voting process is one of interest. Proxy voting is a direct action that shareholders can take to exert control over the corporation. Consequently, institutional investors, given the size of their holdings, have the potential to play an important monitoring role in this process since, conceivably, this is an area in which monitors can influence firms to take wealth-increasing actions.
Existing studies on this subject generally show that they vote in a value-maximizing manner (see, for example, Gillan and Starks, 2000; Gordon and Pound, 1993; Morgan and Poulsen, 2001) . However, similar to other research studying institutional investors as monitors, these papers use aggregate institutional holdings levels to proxy for monitoring by institutions; hence they face the limitation of relying on inference rather than direct evidence to draw conclusions on the monitoring role of institutional investors.
In 2002, Harvey Pitt, then chairman of the SEC, took the stance that mutual fund managers have a fiduciary duty to vote the fund's proxies in the best interests of investors, and hence have a legal obligation to reveal those decisions to investors (WSJ, 2002/3/21) . The SEC began requiring disclosure of fund voting decisions on NPXs beginning in 2004.
1 Because this disclosure makes proxy voting observable, unlike most other ways that shareholders can exert influence on managers, it allows for a direct examination of the role of mutual funds (as one subset of institutional investors) as a monitor of the firm.
We seek to determine whether mutual funds act as effective monitors by exercising their voting power in a wealth-increasing manner (i.e., voting for items expected to increase shareholder wealth and voting against other items). While the finance literature has often asserted that institutions act as monitors, there is some evidence that this may not be the case. For example, Bhide (1993) documents institutional investors' tendency to sell shares (the "Wall Street Rule") rather than take action to create improvement.
We are not the first paper to examine mutual fund voting but we are the first to examine the role of the mutual fund as monitor. Further, we study two years of proxy voting decisions for 1,794 mutual funds from 94 fund families and analyze voting at the fund level. Our paper differs from many of the other existing papers examining mutual fund voting which tend to use one year of data, focus on only the largest fund families, and/or examine voting at the family level. We believe that our broader sample gives greater cross-sectional variation and allows us to draw more general inferences on the role of mutual funds as monitors. Davis and Kim (2006) study the voting records of 21 fund families and find that the potential for business ties affects mutual fund voting. Other contemporaneous working papers examine mutual fund voting. Rothberg and Lilien (2005) describe in detail the voting policies of the ten largest fund families in relation to 12 shareholderproposal types; they find that index funds tend to vote against management more than stock-picking funds and that families may vote their shares as a block. Ashraf and Jayaraman (2006) examine voting patterns by the largest ten funds for 24 fund families and find that funds are more likely to vote for shareholder proposals if the targeted firm performs well or has antitakeover provisions. Chou, Ng, and Wang (2007) examine whether fund governance (proxied by Morningstar stewardship grades) influences their voting patterns; they find that funds with poor governance are more likely to vote in favor of both shareholder-sponsored proposals and management-sponsored antitakeover or board-related proposals.
Other studies on mutual fund voting also exist. Cremers and Romano (2006) examine whether the mutual fund disclosure requirements have impacted funds' decisions to vote against management; they do not find evidence of this. Amzaleg, BenZion, and Rosenfeld (2005) study mutual fund voting in Israel; using a sample of 792 management-sponsored proposals, they find that the odds of voting against "bad"
proposals is negatively associated with fund holdings and the size of funds.
Hypothesis development
The role of the mutual fund as active investor and effective monitor is unclear.
Mutual funds are largely concerned with liquidity since investors can redeem their claim for the market value of the shares of the fund's assets upon demand. Therefore, it is probably not surprising that the existing literature finds that mutual funds (along with other institutions) vote with their feet (the "Wall Street Rule") rather than intervene when firms perform poorly (see Roe, 1990; Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003) . Historically, fund managers may have felt it was not their role to be active monitors. As a Fidelity spokesman puts it, "we would expect to vote in favor of management's proposals most of the time. When we believe a company is not being well-run, we have the option of selling our shares (Boston Globe, 2004/9/5)."
There are, however, also arguments in favor of funds being effective monitors. In some instances, mutual funds hold such a large position in a particular firm that it is difficult to sell shares when a firm performs poorly without further depressing the share price. The investment strategies of some mutual funds also prevent them from selling poorly performing investments. With their substantial voting power, mutual funds are under increasing pressure to play a more assertive role in the proxy voting process (the SEC Final Rule, Rel. #33-8188).
In view of these new developments and based on the prior literature, we test the following hypotheses concerning voting on shareholder proposals to ascertain whether mutual funds exercise their proxy voting power as effective corporate monitors. We choose to focus on shareholder proposals for three reasons. First, the wide dispersion of the types of shareholder-sponsored proposals allows us to examine fund voting in response to a wide variety of issues -some of which clearly increase shareholder wealth and some of which do not. Second, due to the large body of existing literature examining these proposals, we can directly compare our results to earlier results that use aggregate institutional holdings. Focusing on shareholder proposals also allows us to gauge the impact on fund voting decisions of those factors that earlier literature has found important in explaining overall affirmative voting levels (such as proposal and sponsor types).
H1: Mutual funds exercise their voting power as effective monitors.
Assuming that proxy voting is an activity of an effective monitor, we should expect mutual funds to vote affirmatively for shareholder proposals when the proposals have a potentially positive impact on shareholder wealth. (Similarly, we should expect them to vote against proposals which may diminish shareholder wealth.) We use three proxies to distinguish value-increasing proposals from value-decreasing proposals. The first proxy is the broad category classification of the different types of proposals. We group proposals into five broad categories -board-related proposals, compensationrelated proposals, other non-board governance-related proposals (governance proposals), environment-and health-related proposals (environmental proposals), and social-and economic-related proposals (social proposals). We hypothesize that mutual funds will vote more affirmatively on board, compensation and governance proposals than on social and environmental proposals since the former group of proposals is more likely to have a positive impact on shareholder wealth. (Whether specific proposal sponsor types are also related to wealth increases is less clear; we address whether sponsor types appear to influence mutual fund support later in the paper.)
Our second proxy focuses on items found by the previous literature to impact shareholder wealth. Davis and Kim (2006) Mutual funds that own a larger stake in a firm have a greater incentive to undertake costly monitoring and face greater difficulties when selling their shares.
Therefore, we expect these funds to vote more affirmatively on value-increasing shareholder proposals and use the percentage of shares that a fund owns in the targeted firm to proxy for this economic incentive. Black (1990) argues that when an institution owns stakes in numerous companies, it enjoys economies of scale in analyzing common issues across its portfolio firms. He further argues that this incentive offsets the disincentive of collective action problems that cause shareholder passivity. Therefore, we include the total number of holdings in our analysis to proxy for this economies of scale incentive.
Additionally, socially screened (social) mutual funds often have agendas other than maximizing returns to investors. We would expect these types of funds to vote more affirmatively for environmental and social proposals including those which might be considered to be wealth-decreasing. We include a dummy variable indicating whether the fund is a social fund to examine this possibility.
H3: Mutual funds are more likely to vote for shareholder proposals that target firms with weak corporate governance.
We hypothesize that, post Enron, mutual funds are more alert to firms that have poor corporate governance, and hence are likely to vote more affirmatively for shareholder proposals targeting those firms. We use the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick Gindex, ownership levels, and board structure to proxy for a firm's governance structure.
Following prior literature, a higher G-index, larger board, fewer independent directors on the board, lower institutional ownership, greater officers' and directors' ownership, lack of outside blockholders, and combined CEO and Chairman positions indicate potentially weak governance (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) . We collect proposal, firm, and mutual fund level data for each voting record.
Proposal-level data includes proposal description, sponsor identity, ISS voting recommendation, and the overall voting result for each proposal. We gather proposal and sponsor data from the annual proxy statements and proposal recommendations and voting results from ISS. For firm-level data, we gather institutional holdings from the S&P Security Owners Stock Guide, and officers' and directors' holdings, outside blockholdings, and board-related data from the annual proxy statements. We collect the For each fund that votes on at least one proposal in our sample, we obtain fund characteristics including turnover ratios, expense ratios, prior fund performance, fund size (measured as net assets), and portfolio holdings from the Mutual Funds Advanced module of Morningstar Principia. (We exclude closed-end and variable insurance funds not included in this module.) Our final sample consists of 212,620 voting decisions made by 1,794 mutual funds belonging to 94 fund families. A total of 356 firms receive shareholder proposals during our two year sample period (after controlling for data availability). Since shareholders may target a firm in both years, a firm may appear in our sample more than once. 4 Table 2 Panel A reports summary statistics for the 510 firm years in our sample. The majority of our sample firms (239 of the 356) are S&P500 firms which is not surprising given that the literature has shown that shareholder proponents are more likely to target larger firms (Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling, 1996) . Because of the proportion of larger firms in our sample, the mean total assets of our firms ($52.4 billion) is quite large and may be due to firms such as Citigroup which has total assets of over $1. 4 A firm may receive more than one shareholder proposal in a given year (the greatest number of proposals received by a firm in a year is 15 while the average number is two); however, for purposes of this 
Sample description
Proposal types and sponsors
The existing literature has shown that voting returns varies systematically with sponsor identity (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Gillan and Starks, 2000) . Given that sponsor types affect voting returns, mutual fund managers may also be influenced by sponsor types. Following prior literature, we classify sponsor types into seven categories:
institutional investors, pensions, unions, religious and environmental groups, individual activists, individual occasionals, and unknown sponsors. (Some firms in our sample did not disclose sponsor identity so we classify those sponsors as unknown.) (2000) show that institutional investors focus more on governance-related proposals, such as repealing antitakeover devices. Our findings also contrast with the perception that pension funds are the leaders in promoting better corporate governance.
One potential explanation for the differing results is that pension funds may have resorted to private negotiations instead of the more public forum of shareholder proposals to work out governance issues with the firms. Comparing Table 4 with Table 1 indicates that items appearing the most frequently also receive the highest level of fund support. This is especially true for board, governance, and compensation proposals. Assuming proposal submission frequency proxies for shareholder interest on an issue, this result also suggests that mutual funds vote in the interest of investors. An exception to this link between proposal frequency and voting decisions is confidential voting, which only appears four times on a ballot, but receives affirmative fund voting decisions 78.5% of the time. (Confidential voting was proposed with greater frequency during the time periods studied in earlier research (Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner, 1996; Gillan and Starks, 2000) .)
Analysis of mutual fund voting
Mutual fund voting decisions
We witness a shift in proposal submission momentum and support for majority In summary, our results support our first hypothesis that mutual funds exercise their voting power in a manner consistent with being an effective monitor. They support shareholder proposals and vote against management when they believe the proposal may have a positive effect on firm value.
Mutual fund voting approval rates versus the voting approval rates of other voters
Since our objective is to examine whether mutual funds are effective monitors, we compare mutual fund approval rates to the approval rates of the rest of the voters. If mutual funds are no more effective at monitoring than other investors, then we should not find any significant differences. respectively). Regardless of which proxy for proposal quality that we use (proposal classification, key items, or ISS recommendation), mutual funds appear better able to discern and more willing to vote for higher quality (i.e., value-increasing) proposals.
Approval rates related to sponsor types also vary. First, proposals sponsored by individual activists receive much higher levels of support from mutual funds than from the remaining voters. This may be due to this type of sponsor proposing mainly governance and board proposals. Second, mutual funds tend not to support proposals sponsored by religious and environmental groups, institutional sponsors, and individual occasionals with approval rates being lower than other voters on these proposals.
In summary, we find that mutual funds do vote differently than the rest of the voters. 12 The differences in voting patterns support our hypothesis that mutual funds act as effective monitors by selectively voting for those proposals that are most likely to enhance shareholder wealth.
Determinants of mutual fund voting decisions
Mutual fund voting decisions and fund family voting policies
We examine whether fund families vote in a coordinated manner in order to help determine whether fund characteristics may impact voting decisions. If voting decisions are coordinated at the fund family level via standardized voting policies, as reported by prior research (Downes, Houminer, and Hubbard, 1999; Rothberg and Lilien, 2005) , then the characteristics of the individual funds should not matter. However, some anecdotal evidence shows that individual funds have discretion in how they vote either because the guideline at the family level is too general or because the situation related to the proposal and the targeted firm is complex necessitating that the voting decision be made at the lower fund level (WSJ, 2006/12/22) . To ascertain how much discretion individual funds potentially have, we analyze variation in mutual fund voting decisions within the same fund family. This is an important issue and has direct implication on the validity of our research design, which studies the determinants of mutual fund voting at the individual fund level instead of at the family level. Results are reported in Table 6.   13 12 Since the other investors include other institutional investors, such as pension funds, which may also act as monitors, our results should actually be biased toward not finding any significant differences between the two groups. 13 We exclude three fund families that each have only one fund with proxy voting disclosure.
We study the dispersion of fund voting decisions within the same fund family by the proposal items profiled in In general, we are more likely to see divergence in fund votes within the same fund family for board, governance, and compensation issues than for environmental and social issues. Hence, the findings are consistent with the notion that funds may exercise greater discretion when voting on more complex issues or issues that could potentially have a larger impact on firm value. In summary, these results support our conjecture that some mutual funds exercise voting discretion at the individual fund level, which poses the question of what factors drive some funds to vote differently than others. We address this in the next session.
Mutual fund voting and fund and firm characteristics
We have shown that mutual funds do appear to effectively use the proxy voting process by identifying and voting for shareholder resolutions that are potentially wealth increasing. In this section, we test our hypotheses by examining fund voting in relation to proposal quality, fund characteristics, and firm characteristics in multivariate analysis.
Since we wish to examine the factors driving the fund voting decisions, our dependent variable is whether or not the fund votes in favor of a proposal. We control for proposal quality by using dummy variables for proposal types, whether the proposal represents a key item as defined in Davis and Kim (2006) , and whether the proposal receives an affirmative ISS recommendation to distinguish between potentially value-increasing proposals and value-decreasing proposals.
Since we wish to examine whether fund characteristics influence voting and since we found in Section 4.1 that funds do not always vote unanimously across fund families, we also control for mutual fund characteristics. We include turnover, expense ratio, the fund's holdings in the targeted firm, the number of total securities held by the fund, and a dummy variable for whether the fund is a social fund.
To test our hypotheses on fund voting in relation to firm characteristics, we include in the regressions variables found to be important in earlier literature including ownership structure (officers' and directors', institutional, and block holdings), G-index, board size, the percentage of the outside directors on the board, and a dummy variable denoting combined Chairman and CEO positions. We include dummies for sponsor types, fund size, one-year fund past performance, firm size, and one-year firm past performance as control variables. We also include a 2005 year dummy to control for the possibility of a time trend and run fixed effects for fund families since some voting decisions may be standardized at the family level. 14 All test statistics are based on robust standard errors.
We run three logistic regressions. The first regression examines what drives a fund to vote for a proposal for the complete sample (Model 1), while the second and third regressions look specifically at what factors influence the voting decisions for proposals that ISS recommends in favor of (ISS recommended) (Model 2) and proposals that ISS recommends against (ISS non-recommended) (Model 3). 15 We make this distinction between ISS recommended and ISS non-recommended items since simply voting for a proposal does not necessarily indicate that a fund is voting in a manner consistent with being an effective monitor given that not all proposals are likely to positively impact shareholder wealth. These regressions are shown in Table 7 .
Consistent with our earlier findings, we find that mutual funds are likely to vote favorably for Davis and Kim (2006) key items and items recommended by ISS. Further, funds are more likely to support board, governance, and compensation proposals than other proposal types. The marginal effects for these factors are among the largest reported in the table. This is to be expected since these are our proxies for proposal quality (whether the proposals will impact shareholder wealth in a positive manner). Sponsor type also appears to play a role in voting -religious sponsors always receive lower voting 14 We lose 93 observations from two fund families due to fund family fixed effects. For one family, all funds always vote for shareholder proposals while in the other family all funds always vote against shareholder proposals. 15 We run several robustness checks (not shown) which include the following. We run the regressions omitting all but one of the proxies for proposal quality (proposal classification, key items, and ISS recommendations). We use alternative definitions of key items including one which replaces cumulative voting with majority voting and another which adds majority voting to the six key items defined by Davis and Kim (2006 We also find evidence that, even after controlling for family coordination, fund characteristics impact the mutual funds' voting decisions (and ultimately their role as monitors). Fund turnover and expense ratios are both negatively related to the likelihood of voting in support of a proposal suggesting that funds with longer investment horizons may be more likely to act as monitors. When a fund owns a larger stake in the firm, it is also more likely to vote for shareholder proposals (Model 1 and 2), which is consistent with funds with larger financial stakes in the targeted firm being more willing to take an active stance. Consistent with the argument of economies of scale (Black, 1990) , funds holding a larger number of securities vote more affirmatively for shareholder proposals.
16
Social funds are more likely than other funds to vote for proposals (both ISS recommended and ISS non-recommended) which is consistent with their voting in line with their social agendas. Fund size and fund past performance are also both negatively related to voting for a proposal; this result on performance suggests that funds with poor 16 There is a strong correlation between a fund being an index fund and the number of securities held by a fund. An average index fund in our sample holds 917 securities while a non-index fund holds 192. If we replace the number of securities held by the fund with an index fund dummy variable, we get results similar to those shown here.
performance may be looking for ways to increase their performance by pressuring management to implement wealth-increasing items. Not surprisingly, the marginal effects of the fund characteristics are lower than the proposal characteristics but are still economically significant, especially for Model 2.
Firm characteristics also impact mutual fund voting in a manner consistent with our predictions. Funds are more likely to vote for proposals when institutional and outside block holdings and the percentage of outsiders on the board are lower and when G-index and board size are higher. This evidence suggests that mutual funds are more likely to support proposals which target firms with weaker governance. It also suggests that funds may be more likely to take on a monitoring role when other monitors are weak (lower institutional and block holdings and fewer outside directors). Firm size is negatively related to the affirmative voting decisions which may be consistent with the coordination/free-rider problem found with larger firms. Contrary to the findings of Gordon and Pound (1993) , who find that overall voting results are negatively related to past performance, we find that firm performance is positively related to affirmative fund voting decisions; this result may be due in part to the generally good overall performance of the firms in our sample. The marginal effects show that many of the firm characteristics are also economically significant, at least for ISS recommended proposals.
We find some differences between voting on ISS recommended and ISS nonrecommended items other than the differing roles of sponsors already discussed above.
For the ISS non-recommended set (those items unlikely to increase wealth), fund turnover, fund past performance, fund's holdings in the firm, board size, and the 2005 proxy-year dummy no longer play a significant role in impacting the fund's voting decision while outside blockholdings, G-index, and firm past performance now play the opposite role as before. Thus, there do appear to be significant differences in the factors (including turnover, fund performance, and fund's holdings) that lead to voting for potentially wealth-increasing versus potentially wealth-decreasing items. The marginal effects of the factors that we hypothesize to impact fund voting are larger in Model 2 (examining voting for potentially wealth-increasing proposals) than in Model 1 or 3.
In summary, we find evidence that mutual funds vote in an effective manner by supporting potentially wealth-increasing proposals and that both fund and firm characteristics play important roles in the funds' voting decisions. Funds with longer investment horizons (i.e., lower turnover and expense ratios) and with greater holdings in the firm appear more likely to support wealth-increasing proposals. Funds are also more likely to support proposals aimed at firms with weaker governance structures.
Impact of mutual fund voting rates on voting outcome
Mutual funds own a significant portion of the stock of U.S. firms and in many cases, they may be considered to be the swing voters who determine whether or not a shareholder proposal will pass (WSJ, 2003/11/10 As Model 2 shows, fund approval rate has a significant impact on whether the shareholder proposal passes. 19 The only other factors that have a larger marginal effect are officers' and directors' holdings (officers and directors typically vote against shareholder-sponsored proposals) and whether the item receives an affirmative ISS recommendation. As expected, if a proposal is a key item or is supported by ISS, it is more likely to pass. Board, governance, and compensation items are also more likely to pass than other item types. Consistent with prior literature, large institutional ownership has a positive effect on the success rate of shareholder proposals (Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner, 1996) . G-index is negatively related to the likelihood of shareholder proposals being passed after including the mutual fund approval rate and suggests that other voters may not consider the firm's governance structure to the same extent that mutual funds do. 17 In the US, shareholder proposals are not legally binding. Even if passed by the necessary percentage of votes, management is not required to implement them. We examine whether the vote passes, not whether the item is ultimately implemented. Disclosure of item implementation (or lack thereof) is often lacking. 18 The social proposal dummy is not included in this regression since none of these proposals pass. 19 The adjusted pseudo R-squared of Model 2 is significantly higher than that of Model 1, 0.641 versus 0.497. We also compare Model 1 and 2 using a partial likelihood ratio test, which is similar to the F-test in OLS regressions. The chi-square test statistics is 75.2 (p-value<0.001), again suggesting that fund approval rate is an important explanatory variable for the probability of the shareholder proposal being passed.
In summary, our results suggest that mutual fund votes play an important role in the passage of shareholder proposals. While funds do not generally own enough shares to ensure passage of the item based on their votes alone, they do appear to significantly influence voting outcomes.
Conclusions
Using recently available voting data, we construct a detailed proxy voting dataset Consistent with prior literature, we find that mutual funds are more likely to vote against rather than for shareholder proposals (mutual funds vote affirmatively for only 26% of the proposals in our sample). However, we also find evidence that funds tend to support proposals which are likely to positively impact shareholder wealth (proxied for by proposal classification types, affirmative ISS recommendations, and the six key items as described in Davis and Kim (2006) ) -these proposals include ones targeting important aspects of corporate governance such as adopting majority voting or potential agency conflicts such as golden parachutes and poison pills. Furthermore, when we compare mutual fund approval rates to the voting approval rates of other shareholders, we find that while funds vote less affirmatively overall, mutual funds are more likely than other voters to vote affirmatively on proposals that are likely to increase wealth. This evidence supports the theory that mutual funds act as effective monitors when exercising their proxy voting rights.
We also find evidence that fund and firm characteristics influence funds' voting decisions. Funds with lower turnover and expense ratios tend to vote more affirmatively for shareholder proposals. Larger numbers of securities in the funds' portfolio and larger stakes in the firm by the funds also lead to a greater willingness to support shareholder proposals. Social funds, probably due to their social agendas, are more likely than other fund types to vote for shareholder resolutions. We also find evidence that funds support proposals targeting firms with weaker governance (measured as higher G-index, larger board size, and lower institutional holdings). Finally, we find that fund approval rates have a significant impact on whether a proposal is ultimately passed by shareholders.
Our results are consistent with mutual funds acting as effective monitors through the proxy voting process. Funds do not support all shareholder proposals -instead they appear to limit their support to those expected to increase shareholder wealth. Funds are also more likely to vote in favor of value-increasing proposals than are other investor types. Finally, we find evidence that both fund and firm characteristics may influence the voting decision and that fund voting approval rates impact whether the proposal passes. Table 5 Comparison of mutual fund voting approval rates to the approval rates of the other voters in regards to proposal types, key items, ISS recommendations, and sponsor types This table compares the mutual fund voting approval rates to the approval rates of the other voters. We calculate the mutual fund approval rate as the number of shares that funds voted affirmatively for a proposal over the total number of votes cast by the funds. The approval rate by other voters is the total number of affirmative votes minus affirmative votes cast by mutual funds over the total number of votes cast minus total votes cast by mutual funds. Following Davis and Kim (2006) , we classify board declassification, cumulative voting, independent board chairman, golden parachutes, stock option expensing, and poison pills as key proposal items (key items).
a , b , and c denote the significance levels of the t-test of the paired differences between the fund approval rate and the approval rate of other voters at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Table 6 Analysis of mutual fund voting decisions within and across fund families This table reports summary information on individual mutual fund voting decisions within and across fund families for all the proposal types listed in Table 1 , except for the miscellaneous proposals. We report the total number of fund families that voted on a proposal, the number of fund families within which all the funds voted unanimously for the proposal, and the number of fund families within which all the funds voted unanimously against the proposal. For those families where the funds did not vote unanimously, we list the number of fund families, the ratio of these fund families to the total number of voting fund families, and the percent of proposals for which these funds vote affirmatively. We exclude three fund families that consist of only one fund. * denotes proposal types classified as key items. (1) Full sample (2) ISSFor = 1 (3) ISSFor = 0 (2) Coeff.
(1) Coeff.
